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Abstract
This paper describes an experience in the application of the RuleBase model checker
to software written in C, using the tool c2edl. C2edl translates ANSI-C code to
EDL, the input language of RuleBase. Although c2edl uses a radical abstraction in
order to address the problems of software model checking, the abstract model built
by c2edl proved suÆcient to allow analysis of the garbage collection mechanism of
SMV. Using c2edl and RuleBase, eight bugs were found in RuleBase itself, which
uses the same garbage collection mechanism.
1 Introduction
In recent years, model checking has gained wide acceptance as a powerful tool
for hardware design, and has become an integral part of the verication pro-
cess in IBM and other companies [16,3,24,19,34,1,38]. In the past few years,
there has been increasing interest in the application of model checking to soft-
ware. One approach [22,23,36,20,2,37] is to develop new techniques which are
specialized for software. A second approach [15,26,28,27,14] is to use modeling
techniques that allow the application of existing tools. The advantage of the
former is that it allows the diÆculties inherent in software model checking
to be addressed directly, while the advantage of the latter is that years of
development and optimization eort put into an existing tool do not go to
waste. In this paper, we describe an experience with the second approach, us-
ing the tool c2edl. C2edl translates ANSI-C code to EDL, the input language
of the RuleBase model checker [6]. C2edl uses a radical abstraction in order to
address the problems of software model checking. Nevertheless, the abstract
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model built by c2edl proved suÆcient to allow analysis of the garbage collec-
tion mechanism of SMV. Using c2edl and RuleBase, eight bugs were found in
RuleBase itself, which uses the same garbage collection mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares
this work with related work. Section 3 gives some background on RuleBase.
Section 4 describes how a program can be represented in a form suitable for
symbolic model checking. Section 5 presents the tool c2edl. Section 6 discusses
the application of model checking to the garbage collection mechanism of
SMV, and gives experimental results. Section 7 concludes and points to future
directions for research.
2 Comparison with related work
Many previous works have described the process of verifying high level models
of software [12,29,30]. In this paper, we apply model checking to the source
code itself, by means of an automatically generated abstraction, rather than
to a hand coded high level model.
There is extensive previous work on the application of model checking
to the source code of railway interlocking software [25,33,10,11,18,17]. While
technically a railway interlocking is a piece of software, the semantics of railway
interlocking languages are extremely simple, to the extent that Sheeran and
Stalmarck term interlockings hardware-like systems [35]. In this paper, we
apply model checking to software written in the general purpose language C.
Godefroid [22,23] describes VeriSoft, a tool for model checking concurrent
software written in C or C++, and the successful verication of a 2500 line
concurrent C program is noted. The focus of [22,23] is the search algorithm,
which performs a variety of explicit state space exploration. Stoller [36] takes
an approach similar to that of [22,23] for Java programs. In this paper, we do
not modify the model checking algorithm. Rather, we use c2edl to translate
C code into the input language of our model checker, and use the existing
algorithms to verify certain useful properties of the program.
Demartini, Iosif and Sisto [15] describe the application of the SPIN model
checker to Java multithreading applications. They describe the process of
translating Java source code into PROMELA, the input language of SPIN.
Their goal, like that of this paper, is to verify source code, using automatic
abstraction techniques to get a simplied model. They demonstrate their
technique on toy examples. Havelund and Pressburger [26] take an approach
similar to [15] in the rst generation of their tool Java PathFinder, but support
more of the language, and note results for Java programs of up to 2000 lines
of code. In both [15] and [26], the translation is complicated by the need to
model the concurrency primitives of Java, while the method used by c2edl
is free of those concerns. On the other hand, the translations of [15,26] are
in some ways simpler than that of c2edl, because the PROMELA language
allows them to retain much more of the structure of the original program than
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does EDL.
Visser, Havelund, Brat and Park present the second generation of Java
PathFinder in [37]. While the rst generation translates Java source code into
PROMELA, the second generation is a full-blown custom-made model checker
for Java. In contrast, we have not developed a new model checking algorithm,
but used modeling techniques to allow the application of an existing one.
Holzmann and Smith [28] present a method for extracting verication mod-
els from source code that results, as here, in a control-ow skeleton. However,
their abstraction process is only semi-automatic, and is aided by a lookup
table and model template manually coded by the user. In contrast, the use of
c2edl does not require manual intervention. They describe the results of an
application of their method to commercial call processing software written in
C, although they do not mention the size of this software. In [27], Holzmann
describes another application of the method to a checkpoint management sys-
tem. Again, the size of the software is not discussed.
Corbett et al [14] describe Bandera, a tool for automatic extraction of
nite state models from Java source code. They perform user-guided abstrac-
tions based on reducing the cardinality of data sets, and provide a language
for specifying additional abstractions. They translate Java to an interme-
diate language which is then translated to one of a number model checking
languages. They demonstrate their method on a toy example, a threaded
pipeline consisting of 60 lines of Java code. In contrast, c2edl is completely
automatic, and we present results for a non-trivial application.
Esparza, Hansel, Rossmanith and Schwoon [20] describe model checking
algorithms for pushdown automata. They take, as we do, the radical approach
of abstracting away all variable values. However, they are not limited to a nite
stack. In contrast, c2edl produces a nite state model for RuleBase. They give
impressive results for randomly generated ow graphs (skeleton programs) of
up to 20,000 lines.
Finally, Ball and Rajamani [2] describe Bebop, a symbolic model checker
for boolean programs. They have developed a specialized algorithm for model
checking software, which appears to be limited to checking properties which
are directly represented by the user as reachability queries. In contrast, we
check properties expressed in temporal logic. Their approach to the semantic
diÆculties of software is to limit all variables to boolean values, and procedure
calls to call-by-value parameters. Like [20], they are not limited to nite state
systems. They show results for a simple family of programs with increasingly
deep levels of nested procedure calls, but limited non-determinism. In con-
trast, we put an articial limit on the level of nesting, but easily deal with a
high level of non-deterministic behavior.
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3 Preliminaries
The work described in this paper was performed using RuleBase [6]. RuleBase
was originally based on a version of SMV [32]. After eight years of develop-
ment [4,8,3,9,7,5,6,21], the original SMV code is a small part of the whole.
Nevertheless, the garbage collection mechanism of SMV remains.
The input language of RuleBase is EDL, a dialect of the language SMV.
RuleBase uses the temporal logic Sugar [4] as its specication language. Sugar
combines the power of regular expressions with a syntactic sugaring of CTL.
The work described in this paper uses only one kind of Sugar formula, a suÆx
implication. Informally, such a formula consists of two parts: a sequence and
a required condition. A sequence is a nite prex of a computation path,
described as a regular expression. A required condition is a Sugar formula
which is required to hold in every nal state of the sequence. For example,
the following Sugar formula:
ftrue[]; a; b[]; c[+]g(d)(1)
states that d is required to hold at the nal state of every sequence described
by the regular expression ab  c+. The equivalent CTL formula is:
:EF (a ^ EX E[b U E[c U (c ^ :d)]])(2)
4 Expressing a program as a set of next-state functions
The process of translating a program to a set of next-state functions suitable
for model checking is similar to that of [31,13]. We describe it informally
for a simple example, then add details. Consider the C function getmax() of
Figure 1. We annotate the code with the value of the program counter (pc).
If we restrict the integers a and max to the range 0 through 3, we can then
getmax ()f
int max, a;
0 a = max = 0;
1 do f
2 if (a > max)
3 max = a;
4 a = input();
5 g while(a);
6 return(max);
7 g
Fig. 1. Function getmax() in C
rewrite getmax() in terms of next-state functions of the variables, as shown
in Figure 2. We have expressed the call to a = input() as a non-deterministic
assignment to the variable a. The next state functions of the other variables
are deterministic. For simplicity, we have ignored the details of translating
the return statement (an example including function calls appears below).
With minor syntactic changes and the addition of state variable declarations,
Figure 2 is a complete SMV or EDL program, and can be model checked using
SMV or RuleBase.
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next(a) = if pc=0 then 0
else if pc=4 then f0,1,2,3g
else a
next(max) = if pc=0 then 0
else if pc=3 then a
else max
next(pc) = if pc=0 then 1
else if pc=1 then 2
else if pc=2 then if a>max then 3 else 4
else if pc=3 then 4
else if pc=4 then 5
else if pc=5 then if a then 1 else 6
else if pc=6 then 7
else if pc=7 then 7
Fig. 2. Function getmax() in terms of next-state functions
doit() f
int max;
8 max = getmax();
9 g
Fig. 3. Program doit()
Of course, an interesting C program will typically be more complicated
than function getmax(). Extending the translation to other kinds of branch-
ing and loop statements is straightforward. However, the translation process
should also be able to deal with complex data types, pointers, and function
calls, including recursive function calls. All of these could be dealt with by
mimicking a compiler, or by starting the translation from assembly or machine
code
2
. However, such a solution would be purely theoretical, since the state
explosion problem would make it impossible to model check all but the most
trivial programs. In the next section, we describe the solution used by c2edl.
5 C2edl
The solution to the semantic problems of modeling software used by c2edl is
a radical abstraction which is easily automated. C2edl eliminates all variables
except for the program counter and a nite stack, and replaces references to the
variables with non-deterministic choice (i.e., if (a > max) becomes if f0; 1g).
The result is a skeleton program that represents an over-approximation of all
possible control ows of the original program. For instance, consider program
doit() shown in Figure 3 which calls function getmax() of Figure 1. Its ab-
straction is shown in Figure 4. Since all variables are eliminated, complex
data types and pointers do not require special treatment. There is no need to
save the values of local variables on the stack (because there are none). Thus,
to support function calls, including recursive calls, it is enough to save the
program counter. The stack is limited to a nite (and small) depth by use of
2
Recursion would still be problematical in theory, since it is potentially innite. We can
ignore this problem if we assume that our software is running on some real machine, with
a nite stack.
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next(pc) = if pc=0 then 1
else if pc=1 then 2
else if pc=2 then if f0,1g then 3 else 4
else if pc=3 then 4
else if pc=4 then 5
else if pc=5 then if f0,1g then 1 else 6
else if pc=6 then stack(stackp-1)
else if pc=7 then 7
else if pc=8 then 0
else if pc=9 then 9
next(stackp) = if pc=8 then stackp inc
else if pc=6 then stackp dec
else stackp
next(stack(stackp)) = if pc=8 then 9
else stack(stackp)
stackp inc = if stackp = max stackp then stackp else stackp+1
stackp dec = if stackp = 0 then stackp else stackp-1
invar stackp <= max stackp
Fig. 4. Program doit() abstracted
next(stackp) = if somecall then stackp inc
else if somereturn then stackp dec
else stackp
next(stack(stackp)) = if somecall then nextpcnocall
else stack(stackp)
Fig. 5. Standardized behavior of the stack
an invariant.
The implementation itself is very simple. After parsing the source code,
the program counter is allocated by traversing the parse tree. Generating the
behavior of the program counter is then a matter of traversing the numbered
parse tree a second time. During this traversal, information needed to gener-
ate propositions somecall (indicating a function call), somereturn (indicating
the end of a function or a return statement), and nextpcnocall (indicates
the return point to be pushed onto the stack for a function call) is gathered.
These are used to standardize the behavior of the stack as shown in Fig-
ure 5. In addition to propositions somecall, somereturn, and nextpcnocall,
c2edl automatically generates propositions of the form assign v (indicating an
assignment to variable v), use v (indicating a use of variable v) and call f (in-
dicating a call to function f) for each variable v and function f in the program.
This can be done without adding additional variables, because each of these
propositions can be expressed purely as a function of the program counter.
The complete output of c2edl for program doit() is shown in Appendix A.
At rst glance, it seems that the abstraction described rids the model of
all meaning. Indeed, the interesting properties of getmax() can not be veried
using the abstracted model shown in Figure 4. However, there are programs
for which the abstraction preserves enough information to be useful. The
garbage collection mechanism of SMV is one such example. The process of
model checking it is discussed in the next section.
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6 Model Checking SMV
Using a model built by c2edl, the usage of the garbage collection mechanism
was checked for SMV version r2.4.4, and for RuleBase, which uses the same
mechanism. C2edl was invoked in a mode in which bit vectors are used instead
of integers (see Appendix A), with the stack limited to a depth of 5.
6.1 The Garbage Collection Mechanism of SMV
The model checker SMV uses binary decision diagrams (BDDs) as its basic
data structure. Since memory usage is a problem, it is necessary to periodically
discard BDDs which are no longer needed. This is the job of the garbage
collection mechanism. It works as follows. Garbage collection is performed
at various places in the code by explicit calls to the function mygarbage().
During garbage collection, every BDD not marked to be saved is collected and
discarded. A BDD is saved by a call to the function save bdd(), which puts the
saved BDD on a linked list called the save bdd list, and returns its argument.
For instance, BDD v is safe from collection after a call to save bdd(v), and
after the call v=save bdd(u), where u is some other BDD. A BDD is removed
from the list by a call to release bdd(). For instance, BDD v is released by
the call release bdd(v). There may be several occurrences of the same BDD
on the save bdd list. Function save bdd() always adds one occurrence, and
release bdd() always deletes one.
If a BDD which is needed for a future computation is collected as garbage,
the result is a dangling reference, i.e., a BDD which potentially contains junk.
If a BDD which is not needed for future computation is never released, the
result is a memory leak, a needless blowup in memory requirements.
The problem of a dangling reference can be stated thus for BDD v: if a
value is assigned to v without a call to save bdd(), and if it is not saved by a
call to save bdd() before the next call to mygarbage(), and if it is then used
by another calculation, this is an error. Since we have the following atomic
propositions (generated automatically as described in Section 5):
 assign v: an assignment to v
 call save bdd v: a call to save bdd() with v as an argument, or a call to
save bdd() the result of which is assigned to v
 call mygarbage: a call to mygarbage()
 use v: a use of v
we can express the requirement that there are no dangling references in Sugar
as follows:
ftrue[]; assign v ^ :call save bdd v;:(assign v _ call save bdd v)[];
call mygarbage;:assign v[]; use vg(false)(3)
The problem of a memory leak for BDD v can be stated as follows: if
BDD v is saved by a call to save bdd(), and then another value is assigned to
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v without an intervening call to release bdd(), this is an error. With the aid
of the atomic propositions above, and the additional proposition following:
 call release bdd v: a call to release bdd() with v as an argument
we can express this in Sugar as follows:
ftrue[]; call save bdd v;:call release bdd v[]; assign vg(false)(4)
6.2 Experimental results
C2edl and Formulas 3 and 4 were used to model check the garbage collection
mechanism of SMV. The function build symbols() of le symbols.c was checked
for version r2.4.4 of SMV. Any function calls to functions also appearing in
symbols.c were translated, other function calls were ignored. The generated
model consisted of 3953 lines of code (that is, the value of the program counter
ranged from 0 to 3952). There are 178 variables of type BDD in symbols.c.
For each, Formulas 3 and 4 were generated, for a total of 356 formulas. In
RuleBase, formulas can be grouped into rules. The formulas were checked
on-the-y [9] in 16 groups of 22-24 formulas per rule. Table 1 shows results
for rules build symbols0 through build symbols15. All fails shown are false
negatives as described in the next section.
RuleBase itself was checked as well. In particular, a function called reduc-
tion(), which was being debugged at the time, was checked. The generated
model consisted of 2630 lines of code (that is, the value of the program counter
ranged from 0 to 2629). Out of 352 formulas checked, 47 failed. Of those, 39
were false negatives as described in the next section, and 8 were real problems
with the use of the garbage collection mechanism. The used of c2edl allowed
these problems to be found statically using RuleBase, before the usual regres-
sion testing of a new version had begun. While problems with the use of the
garbage collection mechanism are usually very painful to debug, the use of
c2edl and RuleBase allowed them to be found and xed easily. Instead of an
unexpected result or a mysterious segmentation violation, which is the indica-
tion of a test gone wrong, the counter-examples generated pointed precisely to
the source line (as indicated by the program counter) exhibiting the problem.
6.3 False positives and false negatives
The utility of Formulas 3 and 4 is highly dependent on the coding style used
by the programmer. For instance, the code fragment of Figure 6 is safe in that
...
b = save bdd(a);
c = b;
mygarbage();
d = c;
...
Fig. 6.
the value of c is not corrupted by the call to mygarbage(). However, it will be
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Table 1
Results for SMV version 2.4.4
rule name vars run time memory # formulas # failing
in rule formulas
build symbols0 91 19250 s 141 MB 22 0
build symbols1 91 68580 s 303 MB 22 2
build symbols2 91 28482 s 193 MB 22 1
build symbols3 91 82946 s 321 MB 22 2
build symbols4 91 9048 s 123 MB 22 0
build symbols5 91 13692 s 154 MB 22 1
build symbols6 91 15432 s 149 MB 22 2
build symbols7 91 27076 s 203 MB 22 3
build symbols8 91 42793 s 249 MB 22 3
build symbols9 91 33952 s 216 MB 22 3
build symbols10 91 11186 s 130 MB 22 2
build symbols11 91 18019 s 168 MB 22 3
build symbols12 91 43809 s 247 MB 22 3
build symbols13 91 123990 s 424 MB 22 5
build symbols14 91 99560 s 366 MB 24 7
build symbols15 91 42704 s 276 MB 24 4
agged as a violation by Formula 3 because Formula 3 does not "know" that
variable c was assigned a value previously saved as b.
Another problem is illustrated by Formula 4. It will erroneously ag viola-
tions for local variables the use of which is in fact safe. For instance, consider
function f() and the code fragment which calls it in Figure 7. The call to
bdd ptr f(bdd ptr p,q) f
0 p = save bdd(g(p,q));
1 return(p);
2 g
...
10 a = f(b,c);
11 mygarbage();
12 release bdd(a);
13 d = g(a);
...
Fig. 7.
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release bdd() on line 12 releases the value which was saved inside of function
f() on line 0. However, Formula 4 will ag a second call to function f() as a
violation, because it does not "see" a call to release bdd() for signal p (the
call on line 12 releases signal a) between the two assignments to variable p
from two separate calls to the function. These and other false negatives can
be avoided by adherence to certain coding conventions.
We now turn to the problem of false positives. Firstly, Formulas 3 and 4
probably do not completely express the correct use of the garbage collection
mechanism of SMV. The second problem is more serious. Since we have limited
the depth of our stack, we will not nd errors which occur for only deeper levels
of nested calls. This is a fundamental problem of the model of software as
we have described it. The problem of false positives means that our method
cannot be used for the verication of software. However, false positives are
not a barrier to the use of the technique in the falsication of software. It is
in the practical light of falsication, then, that this work should be viewed.
7 Conclusions and future work
We have described an experience in the application of symbolic model checking
to general purpose software, the garbage collection mechanism of the model
checker itself. In the process, eight real bugs were found in a version of the
model checker under development. While the method is not suitable for ver-
ication, because of the potential for false positives, the experimental results
show that it is extremely useful in the process of falsication.
Future work includes applying the method or variations on it to other
applications. In addition, it would be interesting to experiment with innite
state techniques such as those described in [20], which do not require limiting
the depth of the stack.
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A Output of c2edl for program doit() of Figure 3
Below is the full output of c2edl for program doit() of Figure 3. C2edl outputs
two les, *.cout and *.edl. The *.cout le is the original C code annotated
with the program counter as allocated by c2edl. The *.edl le is the RuleBase
model of the C code, in the language EDL, the input language of RuleBase.
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Figure A.1 shows the le doit.cout. Note that the program counter as allocated
by c2edl diers the numbering used in Figures 1, 3 and 4. Figure A.2 shows
the le doit.edl, the model built by c2edl from program doit(). The model
shown in Figure A.2 uses integers for the program counter and stack; c2edl
has a switch which allows these to be modeled using bit vectors instead. The
depth of the stack is controlled by a parameter. In the example shown here,
the depth was set to 5.
getmax()
f
/* 0 */ a = /* 0 */ max = 0;
/* 1 */ do f
/* 2 */ if (a > max)
/* 4 */ max = a;
/* 5 */ /* push call */;
/* 6 */ a = input();
/* 7 */ g while (a);
/* 8 */ return max;
/* 9 */ return ;
g
doit()
f
/* 10 */ /* push call */;
/* 11 */ max = getmax();
/* 12 */ return ;
g
Fig. A.1. File doit.cout
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var pc: 0..13;
assign init(pc) := 10;
assign next(pc) := case
somereturn: returntowhere;
pc=2:if pcaux=0 then 4 else 5 endif;
pc=7:if pcaux=0 then 2 else 8 endif;
pc=10:0;
pc=13: 13;
else: if pcplusone > maxpc then maxpc else pcplusone endif;
esac;
dene maxpc := 13;
dene pcplusone := pc+1;
var pcaux: 0..2;
dene nextpcnocall := case
pc=2:if pcaux=0 then 4 else 5 endif;
pc=7:if pcaux=0 then 2 else 8 endif;
pc=13: 13;
else: if pcplusone > maxpc then maxpc else pcplusone endif;
esac;
var stackp: 0..6;
%for ii in 0..5 %do
var stack %fiig: 0..13;
assign init(stackp) := 0;
next(stackp) := case
somerealpushcall: if stackp=6 then 6 else stackp + 1 endif;
somereturn: if stackp=0 then 0 else stackp - 1 endif;
else: stackp;
esac;
invar stackp != 6;
var auxnondet: 0..13;
assign next(stack 0) := case
somereturn & (stackp = 1): auxnondet;
(0 != stackp) j !somerealpushcall: stack 0;
else: nextpcnocall;
esac;
assign next(stack 1) := case
somereturn & (stackp = 2): auxnondet;
(1 != stackp) j !somerealpushcall: stack 1;
else: nextpcnocall;
esac;
assign next(stack 2) := case
somereturn & (stackp = 3): auxnondet;
(2 != stackp) j !somerealpushcall: stack 2;
else: nextpcnocall;
esac;
assign next(stack 3) := case
somereturn & (stackp = 4): auxnondet;
(3 != stackp) j !somerealpushcall: stack 3;
else: nextpcnocall;
esac;
assign next(stack 4) := case
somereturn & (stackp = 5): auxnondet;
(4 != stackp) j !somerealpushcall: stack 4;
else: nextpcnocall;
esac;
assign next(stack 5) := case
somereturn & (stackp = 6): auxnondet;
(5 != stackp) j !somerealpushcall: stack 5;
else: nextpcnocall;
esac;
dene stackpminus1 := if stackp = 0 then 0 else stackp - 1 endif;
dene stackpplus1 := if stackp = 6 then 6 else stackp + 1 endif;
dene returntowhere := case
stackpminus1=0:stack 0;
stackpminus1=1:stack 1;
stackpminus1=2:stack 2;
stackpminus1=3:stack 3;
stackpminus1=4:stack 4;
stackpminus1=5:stack 5;
else: 13;
esac;
dene useof a getmax := (0j(pc=2)j(pc=4)j(pc=1));
dene useof max doit := (0);
dene useof max getmax := (0j(pc=2)j(pc=8)j(pc=8));
dene useastopparam a getmax := (0);
dene useastopparam max doit := (0);
dene useastopparam max getmax := (0);
dene useastopparam := (0);
dene assignto a getmax := (0j(pc=0)j(pc=6));
dene assignto max doit := (0j(pc=11));
dene assignto max getmax := (0j(pc=0)j(pc=4));
dene assignto := (0);
dene someassign := (0jassignto a getmaxjassignto max doitjassignto max getmax);
dene callto getmax := (0j(pc=11));
dene callto input := (0j(pc=6));
dene callto doit := (0);
dene somerealcall := (0jcallto getmaxjcallto doit);
dene somereturn := (0jpc=8jpc=9jpc=9jpc=12jpc=12);
dene somerealpushcall := (0jpc=10);
Fig. A.2. File doit.edl
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